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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kody Ray Gibbs appeals from the district court’s order extending the 
period of his probation.  On appeal Gibbs argues the district court was biased 
against him personally and abused its discretion by extending his probation.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Gibbs sold methamphetamine to an underage girl.  (R., pp. 21-23.)  Gibbs 
was charged with and eventually pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 44-45, 55-57.)  The district court sentenced Gibbs to 
15 years with 10 years fixed, but suspended execution of the sentence and 
placed Gibbs on probation for five years.  (R., pp. 60-62, 66-71.)  Gibbs was 
placed in Mental Health Court and his case was reassigned to a different district 
judge.  (R., pp. 73-74.)   
Initially, Gibbs appeared to do well on probation and in Mental Health 
Court.  (See R., pp. 77-106.)  However, after about 11 months on probation, 
Gibbs was ordered to serve discretionary time because he “had a positive UA for 
Spice.”  (R., p. 107.)  The district court allowed Gibbs to stay in Mental Health 
Court and on probation.  (R., p. 109-112.)  A month later, Gibbs was again 
ordered to serve discretionary time because he had used “Spice” and alcohol, 
frequented a bar, and associated with people involved in criminal activity. 
(R., p. 113.)  From August 14, 2014 to October 2, 2014, the progress reports 
were more negative and noting that Gibbs “needs to take this program seriously” 
and reported as a problem that Gibbs had “associate[ed] with a minor.” 
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(R., pp. 115, 117-119, 121-123.)  However, he was again allowed to remain in 
Mental Health Court program and on probation.  (Id.)   
On November 19, 2014, Gibbs’ probation officer filed a Report of 
Probation Violation alleging Gibbs had “engaged in sexual activity with a 14 year 
old girl.”  (R., pp. 127-146.)  The state filed a motion to show cause why 
probation should not be revoked.  (R., pp. 149-170.)  At the filing of the probation 
violation, Gibbs was finally terminated from Mental Health Court.  (R., p. 148.)   
Both the new charge, CRF 2014-21326, arising from the sexual activity 
with a 14-year-old, and the pending probation violation were resolved by a 
written I.C.R. 11(f) Plea Agreement.  (R., pp. 176-179.)  The plea agreement 
stated that Gibbs would plead guilty to felony injury to child in case CRF 2014-
21326 and would serve a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Id.)  The present case 
would be held in “abeyance” until Gibbs completed his period of retained 
jurisdiction.  (Id.)   
During the subsequent probation violation hearing, the district court 
declined to be bound by the parties’ Rule 11 agreement, but stated that it would 
not do anything inconsistent with the sentence imposed in CRF 2014-21326 and 
would continue Gibbs on probation.  (R., p. 180.)  Gibbs admitted the probation 
violation.  (R., p. 180.)  The district court continued Gibbs on probation, but 
extended Gibbs’ probation by another year and ordered as an additional 
condition of probation that Gibbs successfully complete the period of retained 
jurisdiction ordered in CRF 2014-21326.  (R., pp. 182-184.)  After Gibbs 
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completed his period of retained jurisdiction he continued on probation in this 
case. 
On February 23, 2016, Gibbs’ probation officer filed another report of 
probation violation.  (R., pp. 185-188.)  The report alleged that Gibbs committed 
the new felony crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, admitted to using 
methamphetamine, violated the sex offender agreement by possessing three 
unauthorized smart phones, had contact with his methamphetamine supplier, 
and had prohibited contact with a victim.  (Id.)  The state filed a Motion to Show 
Cause Why Probation Should Not Be Revoked.  (R., pp. 205-209.)   
Around this time, Gibbs also became the target of a federal grand jury 
investigation for possession of child pornography.  (See R., p. 227; Conf. R., 
pp. 52-64.)  At the next hearing, the parties discussed the possibility of 
withdrawing the probation violation allegations because of the pending federal 
matter, and the state asked for a continuance to determine the status of the 
federal matter.  (4/27/16 Tr., p. 8, L. 17 – p. 9, L. 8; R., p. 223.)  The Court then 
gave notice that it intended to enforce its orders.  (4/27/16 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, 
L. 12.)   
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, if the State does withdraw the 
allegations, I intend to proceed on an order to show cause.  I have 
the ability to enforce my orders, and if these allegations are proven 
to be true my intention is to impose your Idaho prison sentence, so 
we can proceed at a later date but it would be on an evidentiary 
hearing even if the State wants to withdraw these allegations, so 
does the plaintiff have a proposal on how to proceed with an 
evident -- or at what time would you want to see an evidentiary 
hearing which is what I thought we were going to be here on today 
with all the subpoenas that have been issued and all the people 




MS. KLEMPEL:  And Your Honor – 
 
THE COURT: -- and the time that we’d set aside for that.  
 
(Id.)  The district court was concerned that its orders were not being followed.  
(4/27/16 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 13, L. 2.)  The district court wanted the evidentiary 
hearing to go forward, but Gibbs and the state both indicated they were not 
prepared for the evidentiary hearing, so the district court granted a two-week 
continuance.  (Id.)  The district court stated that it believed it had the power to 
enforce its own orders, but invited both parties to research the issue.  (4/27/16 
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-10.)   
 THE COURT:  Okay. Well, and I think both sides need to 
research my ability to go forward.  I mean I don’t want to do 
something illegal, but my understanding is that the Court has the 
power to enforce its own orders, and if you’re going to strip the 
Court of that power, I’m not – you’d better be sure you can do it.   
 
 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I completely agree the 
Court has the power to enforce its orders, but I think that would be 
a contempt power as opposed to the executive function of coming 
in and presenting substantive evidence on the plea agreement.   
 
(4/27/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-15.)   
 
 The parties eventually filed a proposed plea agreement which 
contemplated that the state would dismiss the motion for order to show cause in 
this present case, and two other cases, and Gibbs would plead guilty in the 
federal case.  (R., pp. 226-228.)  The agreement stated, in part: 
Specifically, the parties stipulate and agree that Defendant shall 
enter a guilty plea to the Indictment, or any subsequently filed 
Superseding Indictment, in United States of America vs. Kody Ray 
Gibbs, United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Case 
No. 2:16 CR 99 BLW.  In exchange for such promise to plead guilty 
the prosecution herein agree to entry of an order to stay or 
continue presently pending matters herein, and/or to dismiss the 
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same without prejudice.  Upon entry of the aforementioned plea the 
prosecution herein will then move to dismiss the aforementioned 
pending matters (Kootenai County Case Nos. CRF 16-3422, CRF 
14-21326, and CRF 13-5235) with prejudice.  
 
(R., p. 227.)   
 
Counsel for Gibbs sent a letter and attachments to the district court, which 
was filed with the court.  (Conf. R. pp. 52-64.)  The letter explained that Gibbs 
was the subject of a federal grand jury investigation for possession of child 
pornography, and it detailed the potential federal punishment, probation and 
incarceration facing Gibbs as a result of the possession of child pornography 
charge.  (Id.)   
At the next hearing, on May 25, 2016, the district court stated that it had 
read Gibbs’ letter, but did not understand “why I would not want to enforce my 
order and impose Mr. Gibbs’ prison sentence in the state of Idaho if he didn’t do 
– if did what he was accused of doing, so I’ll let anybody take on that question.”  
(5/25/16 Tr., p. 15, L. 12 – p. 16, L. 4.)  The state indicated that it wanted to 
dismiss the motion to show cause because it believed Gibbs was going to be 
serving a federal prison sentence.  (5/25/16 Tr., p. 18, L. 10 – p. 24, L. 17.)  The 
district court and the parties discussed the possibility of appointing a special 
prosecutor to enforce the court’s orders and whether that special prosecutor 
would be bound by the plea agreement.  (5/25/16 Tr., p. 24, L. 21 – p. 26, L. 25.)  
The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss its motion to show cause.  
(5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 – p. 28, L. 13.)  The district court indicated it intended to 
appoint a special prosecutor and entered its own order to show cause why 
Gibbs’ probation should not be revoked.  (5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 – p. 28, L. 13.)  
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The district court was concerned that the judiciary’s ability to enforce its own 
orders would be circumvented by the parties' agreement in this case.  (Id.)   
At the next hearing, the district court reconsidered its decision to appoint a 
special prosecutor.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p. 32, L. 4.)  Instead of appointing a 
special prosecutor, the district court recognized that it could change the terms 
and conditions of Gibbs’ probation, including extending the length of probation, 
without a hearing.  (Id.)  The district court changed the period of Gibbs’ probation 
from six years to life.  (Id.)  Gibbs objected because he believed the increase in 
length of the probation constituted an increased sentence.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, 
Ls. 10-24.)  The district court acknowledged that it did not have the power to 
increase the sentence, but stated that it did have the power to increase the 
length of probation.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16.)  The district court 
indicated it would reconsider its decision if the parties were able to provide a 
legal argument to the contrary.  (Id.)   
The district court explained that it was important to extend Gibbs’ 
probation because it would benefit the public to have Gibbs on probation in 
addition to any parole he might be on after he was released from federal 
custody.  (Id.)  The district court explained that increasing Gibbs probation would 
help protect the public.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16, p. 33, L. 25 – 
p. 34, L. 3.)  The district court entered a written order extending Gibbs’ probation 





Gibbs states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Was Mr. Gibbs denied his constitutional right to due process 
because his case was not heard by an impartial judge?  
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sua sponte 
modified Mr. Gibbs’ probation from a term of six years to life 
after the probation violation allegations in this case were 
dismissed? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 1. Has Gibbs failed to show that it was fundamental error for the 
district court to preside over his case because the judge was not impartial?    
 
 2. Has Gibbs failed to show the district court abused its discretion 






The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Remaining On This 
Case And Extending Gibbs’ Probationary Period 
 
A. Introduction 
 Gibbs argues the district court violated his procedural due process right to 
have an impartial judge.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.)  Gibbs claims the 
district court’s decision to remain on the case and extend his probation 
amounted to fundamental error.  (See id.)  Gibbs’ claim that the district judge 
was not impartial fails all three prongs of the fundamental error test.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The fundamental error test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), applies when there is a 
claim of an unobjected to error at a proceeding following the guilt phase.  State v. 
Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174, 307 P.3d 187, 191 (2013) (citing State v. Longest, 
149 Idaho 782, 241 P.3d 955 (2010)).  Under Perry it is the defendant’s burden 
to demonstrate that “the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for 
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) 




C. Gibbs Has Failed To Show The District Court Was Not Impartial  
 
 Gibbs argues on appeal that his due process rights were violated when 
the district court extended his probation because the district court was prejudiced 
against him.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.)  Gibbs concedes he did not raise 
a due process challenge before the district court; therefore he acknowledges he 
must meet the fundamental error standard.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)  
Gibbs’ argument fails all three prongs of the fundamental error test.   
 
1. Gibbs Has Failed To Establish The District Court Was Not Impartial 
And That The District Court Violated An Unwaived Constitutional 
Right By Presiding Over His Case 
 
On appeal Gibbs argues the district court’s involvement in his case 
violated his unwaived constitutional due process right to have an impartial judge.  
(See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (“The judge was not impartial and his 
involvement in this case violated Mr. Gibbs’ right to due process.”), p. 8 (“the 
judge’s bias is clear from the record”), p. 9 (“If this case had been heard by an 
impartial judge, Mr. Gibbs’ probation would not have been extended.”), p. 9 (“the 
judge filled the role of prosecutor himself, which is impermissible, and violated 
Mr. Gibbs’ right to procedural due process”).1)  Contrary to Gibbs’ argument on 
appeal, the district court did not violate his procedural due process rights.   
                                            
1 Gibbs does not argue that the extension of his probation itself violated his 
procedural due process right, but that it was the alleged partiality by the district 
court that violated his procedural due process rights.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 7-10.)  This appears to be an argument that the district court should have 
recused itself, though Gibbs does not use the word “recuse.”  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p. 14 (requesting that if the case is remanded, a different district judge 
preside).)     
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A defendant has a due process right to have an impartial trial judge.  
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 799, 10 P.3d 742, 748 (2000) (citing State v. 
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 776, 810 P.2d 680, 714 (1991) (overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432, 825 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1991)); 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 
197 (1989).  “In Idaho a judge cannot be disqualified for actual prejudice unless it 
is shown that the prejudice is directed against the litigant and is of such a nature 
and character that it would make it impossible for the litigant to get a fair trial.”  
Id. (quoting Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 776, 810 P.2d at 714; State v. Lankford, 
113 Idaho 688, 700, 747 P.2d 710, 722 (1987); State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 
259, 210 P. 208 (1922)).  “Whether the judge’s involvement in the defendant’s 
case reaches the point where disqualification from further participation in a case 
becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.”  Id. (quoting 
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 776, 810 P.2d at 714; Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 
731 P.2d 192 (1987)).  Even when a trial judge has obtained prejudicial 
information regarding the defendant, the judge is “usually presumed to be 
‘capable of disregarding that which should be disregarded’ in our judicial 
system.”  Id.  (quoting Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 776, 810 P.2d at 714; Sivak, 
112 Idaho at 205, 731 P.2d at 200). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has looked to United States Supreme Court 
precedent and determined that judicial rulings alone “almost never” constitute a 
valid basis to establish bias:  
It is enough for present purposes to say the following: First, judicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or 
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partiality motion ... and can only in the rarest circumstances 
evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required.... Almost 
invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal. 
Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts 
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current 
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a 
bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 
Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or 
disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their 
cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.... 
 
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 391, 313 P.3d 1, 47 (2013) (ellipse in original) 
(quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-556 (1994)). 
 Gibbs has failed to establish the district court was not impartial.  Gibbs 
does not point to any evidence that the district court considered improper 
evidence or had any personal animosity towards him.  In fact, even the evidence 
cited by Gibbs shows that the district court was not motivated by any animus 
towards Gibbs, but rather was concerned, generally, about a district court’s 
ability to enforce its own orders.  (See, e.g., 5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 1-16 (“I’m not 
going to let the judiciary’s ability to enforce its own order to be tramped, and I’m 
not mad at either one of you for what you’ve done, but I think it would set a really 
bad precedent for this to be able to be done without a judge’s agreement.”)  The 
district court was correct.   
It is a basic principle that every court has the power to enforce its orders.  
See I.C. § 1-1603.   






2. To enforce order in the proceedings before it or before a person 





4. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and 
to the orders of a judge out of court in an action or proceeding 
pending therein. 
 
See I.C. § 1-1603.  And, in a probation proceeding, the court has continuing 
jurisdiction over probation and may extend probation at any time within the 
probationary period.  I.C. § 20-222.  And the court itself can issue a warrant for 
violation of probation.  I.C. § 20-222(2); see also I.C. § 19-2602 (court can issue 
bench warrant for rearrest of defendant for “any other cause satisfactory to the 
court”).  It was entirely appropriate for the district court to enforce its orders that 
required Gibbs to abide by certain terms of probation.   
The district court explained that it was extending Gibbs’ probation, not out 
of some personal animosity or bias, but rather for the protection of society and 
public safety.  (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16, p. 33, L. 25 – p. 34, 
L. 3.)  This decision was not based on some personal animus toward Gibbs, but 
rather for the legitimate interest in protecting society.  (See, e.g., R., pp. 127-146, 
180 (admitted probation violation due to sexual activity with 14 year old girl), 
p. 227 (Gibbs informed district court he would plead guilty to possession of child 
pornography).)  The ultimate decision to extend Gibbs’ probation was within the 
district court’s discretion.  See I.C. § 20-222(1) (“The period of probation or 
suspension of sentence shall be fixed by the court and may at any time be 
extended or terminated by the court.”).   
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Nor does the fact the district court considered, but ultimately did not, 
appoint a special prosecutor indicate any personal bias towards Gibbs.  Under 
certain circumstances the district court can appoint a special prosecutor.  See 
I.C. § 31-2603(a).2  The district court considered appointing a special prosecutor, 
but ultimately decided not to.  If anything, this decision not to appoint a special 
prosecutor shows the district court was acting within the bounds of the law and 
was not personally prejudiced against Gibbs.   
Gibbs also argues on appeal that the district court was impermissibly 
acting as prosecutor when it considered initiating order to show cause 
proceedings against Gibbs.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  None of the cases 
cited by Gibbs supports a finding that the district court here exceeded its 
authority when it considered appointing a special prosecutor.  See In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955) (holding violation of due process for a 
“judge-grand jury”); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) 
(requiring prosecutors to sign indictments); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of 
Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-838 (1994) (determining whether sanction 
was civil or criminal); Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 
1985) (district court violated due process when it dismissed a civil complaint on 
grounds that were never raised or argued); Young v. United States, 481 U.S.  
 
                                            
2 It is not clear that all the necessary circumstances were present for the district 
court to appoint a special prosecutor under Idaho Code § 31-2603(a).  However, 
that is irrelevant because the district court ultimately decided not to appoint such 
a special prosecutor.   
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787, 799-800 (1987) (under federal rules, district courts can appoint private 
attorneys to prosecute contempt actions). 
The district court considered ordering Gibbs to show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked.  However, the district court ultimately decided 
not to issue such an order.  (See R., p. 230.)  The district court only reserved the 
right to bring a show cause order at a later date.  (Id.)  Thus the district court 
never actually went through with initiating a show cause proceeding against 
Gibbs.   
Even if the district court had gone through with the order to show cause 
proceeding such would have been an appropriate exercise of judicial power.  As 
noted above, the district court has the power to enforce its own orders and 
specifically has powers in the context of probation.  See I.C. §§ 1-1603, 19-2602, 
20-222.  The district court was not attempting to prosecute a crime.  The district 
court was not contemplating initiating a complaint or new criminal proceeding.  
The district court was contemplating issuing an order to show cause why Gibbs 
was not following the district court’s orders.  The court had authority under I.C. 
§§ 19-2602, 20-222 and continuing jurisdiction over Gibbs’ probation.   
Further, in our justice system, it is not unusual for a district court to initiate 
an order to show cause in other contexts.  For example, under the Idaho 
Criminal Rules, the court has the power to initiate both summary and 
nonsummary contempt proceedings if someone has failed to follow a court’s 
order.  See I.C.R. 42.   
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Gibbs has failed to show the district court was biased against him.  There 
is no evidence of personal animosity of the district court toward Gibbs.  Instead 
there is ample evidence of the district court’s legitimate concern regarding 
enforcing its own orders and the protection of society.   
 
2. Gibbs Has Failed To Establish It Was Clear Error For The District 
Court To Preside Over Gibbs’ Case 
 
 It is not clear from the record that Gibbs’ right to an impartial judge was 
violated.  As noted above, there is nothing in the record that indicates any 
personal animosity by the district court toward Gibbs.  See § I.C.1.  There is 
evidence in the record to the contrary.  The district court judge was the same 
judge who oversaw Gibbs’ progress in Mental Health Court. (See R., pp. 77-
106.)  From August 22, 2013 until June 19, 2014 the progress reports, signed by 
the district judge, stated that Gibbs was doing well in the program and on 
probation.  (Id.)  From July 10, 2014 to August 7, 2014, the district court allowed 
Gibbs to stay in Mental Health Court and on probation after positive UAs. 
(R., pp. 109-112.)  Instead of evidence of a prejudiced judge, the record reflects 
a district judge who fairly presided over Gibbs’ case for years.  
That the court exercised authority to oversee Gibbs’ probation and extend 
the length of his probation after Gibbs was accused of additional crimes also fails 
to show bias.  See Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 391, 313 P.3d at 47 (judicial rulings 






3. Gibbs Has Failed To Show The First Two Prongs Of The 
Fundamental Error Test; Thus The Harmlessness Prong Is Moot  
 
If the district court was prejudiced against him, then Gibbs is likely entitled 
to have another district court determine whether his probation should be 
extended.  However, Gibbs has failed to show any clear violation of his right to 
an impartial judge.  The third prong of the fundamental error test is moot 
because Gibbs has failed to show either of the first two prongs of the applicable 
fundamental error test.   
II. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion  
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court has the discretionary authority to extend probation at any 
time so long as the probationary period does not exceed the maximum period for 
which the defendant might have been imprisoned.  See I.C. § 20-222(1).  Here, 
the extension of probation did not exceed the maximum period for which Gibbs 
might have been imprisoned.  Gibbs has failed to show the district court abused 
its discretion when it extended Gibbs’ probationary period.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Determining whether to extend the probationary period is a discretionary 
decision for the trial court.”  State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 815, 932 P.2d 936, 
938 (Ct. App. 1997).  “When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry.  The sequence of the inquiry is 
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and  
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989) (citation omitted).   
 
C. Gibbs Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When 
It Extended His Probation 
 
1. The District Court Rightly Perceived The Issue Of Whether To 
Extend Gibbs’ Probation As One Of Discretion 
 
In deciding to extend Gibbs’ probation, the district court rightly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion.  After considering various other options, the 
district court correctly stated that it had the ability to extend probation at any 
time.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p. 32, L. 4.)   
Since that time it occurred to me that there’s perhaps a simpler 
solution from the Court’s standpoint anyway, and that is that the 
Court has the ability at any point in time with or without a hearing to 
change terms and conditions of probation, add a length to the term 
of probation, and it would be the Court’s intent right now to 
increase the length of probation probably indefinitely which can be 
done under – the nature of the crime was delivery of a controlled 
substance, carries with it potentially a life sentence, so the 
defendant could be on probation for life, so any – anything that the 
State could like to put on the record?  I guess I’m giving notice 
that’s what I’m going to do.  
 
(6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 16 – p. 32, L. 4.)3   The district court recognized that it did  
not have the power to increase the sentence, but correctly noted  that it did have 
                                            
3 On appeal, Gibbs does not argue that this notice and subsequent opportunity to 
argue was inadequate for procedural due process.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-
14.)  Even if it was raised on appeal, it is not clear whether the procedural 
safeguards applicable to probation revocation apply equally to the extension of 
probation.  See State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727, 732, 132 P.3d 1255, 1260 




the power to increase the length of probation.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, 
L. 16.)  The district court recognized the issue as one of discretion.   
2. The District Court Acted Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its 
Discretion And Acted Consistently Within Applicable Legal 
Standards 
 
“[A] court may at any time extend a period of probation so long as the 
probationary period does not exceed the maximum period for which the 
defendant might have been imprisoned.”  State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 1, 5, 
909 P.2d 619, 623 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing I.C. § 20-222).  Idaho Code § 20-
222(1) states:   
(1) The period of probation or suspension of sentence shall be 
fixed by the court and may at any time be extended or terminated 
by the court. Such period with any extension thereof shall not 
exceed the maximum period for which the defendant might have 
been imprisoned. 
 
I.C. § 20-222(1); see also Breeden, 129 Idaho at 815, 932 P.2d at 938. 
Gibbs was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance under Idaho 
Code § 37-2732(A)(1)(A).  (R., p. 66-71.)  Under Idaho Code § 37-2732(A)(1)(A) 
the maximum period for which Gibbs might have been imprisoned is life.  See 
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006) (defining 
“maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned” as “the 
total number of days a defendant may be placed in physical custody for a 
particular crime”).  Extending Gibbs’ probation to lifetime probation was within 
the outer boundaries of the district court’s discretion and was consistent with 
applicable law.   
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On appeal, Gibbs argues the district court did not act within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion or with applicable standards because, he contends, 
the district court acted out of “animus” and the extension “was not reasonably 
related to the goal fostering Mr. Gibbs’ rehabilitation and protecting public 
safety.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.)  Gibbs’ arguments are without merit.  As 
noted above, there is no evidence in the record that the district court acted with 
personal “animus” toward Gibbs.  See §§ I.C.1-2.   
Next, the district court considered Gibbs’ potential federal sentence and 
determined that it would further the goal of protection of society to extend Gibbs’ 
probation.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16.)  The district court explained 
that it would benefit the public to have Gibbs on state probation in addition to 
parole from the federal system.  (Id.)   
THE COURT:  That seemed to be a lot of work and – and I think 
this is a better result for the public.  I think I can protect the public 
better this way than what I was proposing doing earlier.  
 
(6/6/16 Tr., p. 33, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 3.)  Considering the crimes that Gibbs 
admitted to committing, the district court’s decision was reasonable.  (See, e.g., 
R., pp. 21-23, 55-57 (pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, that arose from selling methamphetamine to an underage 
girl), 127-146, 180 (admitted probation violation due to sexual activity with 14-
year-old girl), p. 227 (Gibbs informed district court he would plead guilty to 
possession of child pornography).).   
In Breeden, supra, the district court extended Breeden’s probation without 
a probation violation hearing because extending probation would help protect 
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public safety.  129 Idaho at 814-815, 932 P.2d at 937-938.  Near the conclusion 
of his seven-year probationary period, the state filed a motion to double 
Breeden’s probationary period so he could finish paying off restitution.  Id.  The 
district court granted the motion.  Id.  The Court of Appeals found that it was not 
an abuse of the district court’s discretion to extend the length of Breeden’s 
probationary period.  Id.   
Breeden argued that the extension of probation was an abuse of 
discretion because the extension of probation was for the sole purpose of 
providing a convenient collection mechanism for restitution and did not serve a 
rehabilitative purpose.  Breeden, 129 Idaho at 815-816, 932 P.2d at 938-939.  
The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed.  Id.  The Court explained that “[t]he goal 
of probation is to foster the defendant’s rehabilitation while protecting public 
safety.”  Id. at 816, 932 P.2d at 939 (citing State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 
736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987); State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 123, 867 P.2d 
993, 997 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 748, 838 P.2d 876, 877 
(Ct. App. 1992)).  The Court found that requiring Breeden to pay restitution 
promoted “public safety be exacting a ‘price’ for the crime, which may deter the 
defendant and other from such offenses.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Here, the district 
court also found that extending Gibbs’ period of probation would serve a public 
safety goal.   
Gibbs also argues that the district court did not act within applicable legal 
standards because it could not modify Gibbs’ probation based on conduct that 
was not before the court.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12 -13.)  In support of this 
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argument Gibbs cites to State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 984 P.2d 716 
(Ct. App. 1999).  (See id.)  Findeisen is inapplicable.  Findeisen was sentenced 
by one district judge for kidnapping, intimidating a witness and aggravated 
battery.  Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 228-228, 984 P.2d at 716-717.  Later the same 
day Findeisen was sentenced by a second district judge for a burglary charge.  
Id.  During the second sentencing the second district judge and the prosecutor 
almost exclusively focused their comments on the facts relating to the 
kidnapping, intimidating a witness and aggravated battery charges.  Id. at 229-
230, 984 P.2d at 717-18.  The Court of Appeals found that the second district 
court abused its discretion.  Id.  Here, unlike Findeisen, the district court was not 
entering a sentence for a particular crime.  The district court was considering 
whether to extend Gibbs’ probation.  The district court considered Gibbs’ conduct 
while he was on probation in the present case, which included committing new 
crimes, including possession of child pornography and sexual activity with a 14-
year-old girl.  It is appropriate for a district court to consider a probationer’s 
conduct while he or she is on probation when determining whether to extend or 
reduce the probationary period.  Findeisen is inapplicable.  The district court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and within applicable legal 
standards.   
3. The District Court Reached Its Decision By An Exercise Of Reason  
The district court reached its decision to extend Gibbs’ probation by the 
exercise of reason.  As noted above, the district court first examined other 
methods to enforce its orders and to protect society and solicited advice from the 
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parties.  (See 4/27/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-10; 5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 – p. 28, L. 13.)  
After consideration, the district court declined to appoint a special prosecutor, but 
instead decided to extend Gibbs’ probation.  (6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p. 33, 
L. 16.)  The district court then said it would reconsider its decision if the parties 
provided him with a legal argument to the contrary.  (Id.)  The district court 
determined that extending Gibbs’ probation so he would still be on state 
probation while he was on any potential federal parole would serve public safety.  




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the order of the district 
court.   
 DATED this 8th day of March, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson______ 
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